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Many scholars and economists prefer carbon taxes (the one I love) to
cap-and-trade (the one I’m with) as a mechanism to address climate change
concerns. A carbon tax is arguably simpler and more transparent.
However, the political momentum appears to be behind some form of
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Diego School of Law, Professor Lesley McAllister, Professor Karen Burke, and program
coordinator Leilani Sharrett. Thanks are also due to my fellow panelists, Reuven AviYonah, David Duff and Walter Wang.
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cap-and-trade system. Not wanting to have the perfect (carbon tax) be
the enemy of the better-than-nothing (cap-and-trade), I support cap-andtrade legislation. Recognizing that a federal cap-and-trade program will
affect the tax system both directly and indirectly, this paper will consider
how the direct and indirect tax issues should be resolved. Direct tax issues
include how emissions credits should be treated, the tax consequences of
the receipt of emission allowances, and the tax consequences of the sale of
emission allowances. A cap-and-trade system will affect the tax system
in two broad indirect ways: 1) it will alter the effectiveness of energy
tax incentives contained in the tax system under current law, and
2) the additional costs imposed by a cap-and-trade program will fall
disproportionately on low-income taxpayers. The regressive impact of capand-trade could be resolved in a number of ways, which may include
changing the tax system. The resolution of tax issues should maintain the
environmental effectiveness of the cap-and-trade program without
increasing the complexity of the tax system. The ideal solution would
mitigate climate change while improving the clarity and transparency of
the tax system.
This paper will begin with an introduction of climate change issues,
including a brief history of international mitigation efforts. The next
section will give an overview of cap-and-trade systems and describe how
a typical cap-and-trade system would interact with the current federal
income tax system. The discussion of the interaction of cap-and-trade
with the income tax will include both direct and indirect effects. This
section will then compare those effects with the potential impact of a
carbon tax. The direct impacts of cap-and-trade on the income tax system
occur because the “trade” part of cap-and-trade creates a new financial
instrument that needs to be accounted for within the tax system. A
carbon tax would not create a new financial instrument. Both a carbon
tax and a cap-and-trade system could cause international trade issues that
could affect the income tax system. Both a carbon tax and a cap-andtrade system, by placing an additional cost on energy-intensive products,
could alter the effectiveness of existing energy tax incentives and place a
disproportionate burden on low-income populations.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR ACTION
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states “warming
of the climate is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting
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of snow and ice, and rising average global sea level.”1 The Pew Center
for Global Climate Change notes “the scientific evidence is clear and
compelling: the climate is changing due to human activities.”2 The IPCC
found that “global increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily to
fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing another significant but
smaller contribution.”3 Despite increasing scientific consensus, polls show
Americans’ declining concern about climate change. The Pew Center
for Climate Change found that the proportion of Americans who “think
that there is solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has
been getting warmer over the last few decades” dropped to 57 percent from
71 percent.4 ‘Climate fatigue’ has set in.
Why do I think legislative action will happen in the future? First,
hope springs eternal, and second, the Gulf of Mexico has sprung a big leak,
not of hope, but of oil. On April 20, 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) oil
rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.5 On April
24, a remotely operated vehicle discovered that oil was leaking from the
well.6 BP’s first estimate was that 42,000 gallons of oil per day (1,000
barrels) were leaking from the well 50 miles offshore and a mile under
the sea.7 On April 28, a scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) concluded that the broken well was spewing
five times as much oil as previously estimated, over 200,000 gallons per

1. IPCC 4TH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm.
2. CREATING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE: THE CASE FOR ACTION 2 (May 10, 2010),
http://www.pewclimate.org/publications/report/case-action-creating-clean-energy-future.
3. IPCC 4TH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS, supra note 2, at 37.
4. Richard A. Kerr, Amid Worrisome Signs of Warming, ‘Climate Fatigue’ Sets
In, 326 SCI., 926, 928 (2009). Disclosures of e-mails between British climate scientists
using the words “trick” and “hide” also eroded public belief in climate science. See
Sheila Jasanoff, Testing Time for Climate Science, 328 SCI. 695, 695 (2010). However, a
more recent survey showed that Americans still strongly believe that the earth is
warming, and puts the blame for the reported decline in climate concern on the way the
Pew Center framed its survey questions. See Jon A. Krosnick, The Climate Majority,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010. The Stanford Political Psychology Research Group Survey
found that 88 percent believed that global warming has been happening, and 75 percent
believed that climate change is due to human activity. Id.
5. See Campbell Robertson, Search Continues after Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2010, at A13.
6. See Campbell Robertson, Oil Leaking Underwater From Well in Rig Blast,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at A14.
7. See Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Oil Leaks Could Take Months to
Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A11.
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day.8 On May 13, a group of scientists examining live video of the oil
leaks concluded that the leak was “easily four or five times greater” than
previously estimated.9 On May 22, three scientists estimated the discharge
from the well to be at least 40,000 barrels per day (1.7 million gallons)
and possibly up to 100,000 barrels per day (4.2 million gallons per
day).10 Federal officials later raised their estimate of the leak to 12,000
to 19,000 barrels per day (500,000 to 800,000 gallons).11 After trying
several failed procedures to stem the flow of oil, BP snipped off the damaged
well riser with giant shears, lowered a cap, and began collecting up to
11,000 barrels of oil per day.12 However, the operation may have made
the flow of oil from the well much larger, and there was still no
consensus on the amount of oil flowing into the Gulf.13 On Day 50 after
the rig explosion, the number of oiled birds arriving at the wildlife
rescue center in Fort Jackson, Louisiana, had quintupled.14 On June 10,
2010, the government raised their estimate of the oil flow to 25,000 to
30,000 barrels per day (1 million to 1.3 million gallons per day).15 The
disaster will affect sea life and coastal regions for years to come.16 The
fact that we are seeking oil 50 miles offshore and a mile under the sea
itself should be cause for concern. One commentator stated, “[w]e’ve
entered an age in which the production of energy, particularly from fossil
fuels, demands ever-more-expensive environmental trade-offs . . . we’ve
entered . . . the era of ‘extreme energy.’”17 Another commentator, drawing
an analogy with banks ‘too big to fail,’ noted, “[i]f an oil well is too far
beneath the sea to be plugged when something goes wrong, it’s too deep
to be drilled in the first place.”18
8. See Campbell Robertson, Leslie Kaufman, Henry Fountain & Liz Robbins, Size of
Spill in Gulf of Mexico is Larger Than Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A14.
9. See Justin Gillis, Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010,
at A1.
10. Ian R. MacDonald, John Amos, Timothy Crone & Steve Wereley, The Measure of
a Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at A17.
11. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Estimates Suggest Spill is Biggest in U.S. History, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A15.
12. See Justin Gillis and Henry Fountain, Rate of Oil Leak, Still Not Clear, Puts
Doubt on BP, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A1.
13. Id.
14. Day 50: The Latest on the Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us/10latest.html.
15. Justin Gillis and Henry Fountain, New Estimates Double Rate of Oil Flowing
into Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A1.
16. See e.g., Joseph Berger, Brian Knowlton and Henry Fountain, Dispersal of Oil
Means Cleanup to Take Years, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/08/us/08spill.html.
17. Daniel Gross, Fracking, Oil Sands, and Deep-Water Drilling, SLATE June 6,
2010, http://www.slate.com/toolbare.aspx?action=print&id=2255906.
18. Bob Herbert, Our Epic Foolishness, N.Y. TIMES May 31, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/01/opinion/01herbert.html.
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Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of the famous ocean explorer Jacques
Cousteau, was asked recently about his hopes for the Gulf oil disaster.
He responded, “My hope is that this is the kick in the butt that we
needed to change, . . . and make . . . strong decisions to create a system
which will protect us, which will protect nature, because we depend on
nature for our own survival and well-being.”19 After the election of
Barack Obama, his policy advisor and future Chief of Staff Rahm
Emmanuel famously said, “You never want a serious crisis to go to
waste. [A] crisis provides the opportunity for us to do things that you
could not do before.”20 President Obama wasted little time in connecting
the disaster in the Gulf with his clean energy agenda, endorsing the
pending Senate climate bill,21 stating that “the challenges we face—
underscored by the immense tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico—are reason
to redouble our efforts to reform our nation’s energy policies.”22 A few
days later, the President reiterated, “We know that our dependence on
foreign oil endangers our security and our economy. And the disaster in
the gulf only underscores that even as we pursue domestic production to
reduce our reliance on imported oil, our long-term security depends on
the development of alternative sources of fuel and new transportation
technologies.”23 With unfortunate timing, however, the President had
proposed new offshore drilling just weeks before the rig exploded.24
The offshore drilling proposal was designed to help win political support
for comprehensive energy and climate legislation.25 The Administration’s
back-tracking on support for broad off-shore drilling, among other
issues, caused the loss of some key Senate allies on energy legislation.
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-NC), a former supporter of comprehensive
energy reform, stated that “the problems created by the historic oil spill
in the gulf, along with the uncertainty of immigration politics, have
19. Interview by Lauren Brook with Jean-Michel Cousteau, (June 8, 2010), available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june10/cousteau_06-08.html.
20. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008,
at A2.
21. The American Power Act, (111th Cong., 2d Sess. 2010) (May 12, 2010).
22. John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a Gulf
Spill that Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/
science/earth/13climate.html.
23. John M. Broder, Obama Sketches Energy Plan in Oil, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/science/earth/22assess.html.
24. John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to Oil Drilling, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 6651796.
25. Id.
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made it extremely difficult for transformational legislation in the area of
energy and climate to garner bipartisan support at this time.”26 However,
even before the Gulf disaster, climate change legislation faced frenzied
political activity. After the American Clean Energy and Security Act27
(ACES, a.k.a. Waxman-Markey) climate bill passed in June of last year,
the Open Secrets Blog reported that according to data collected by the
Center for Responsive Politics, legislators opposed to the climate bill
received more than double the funds from energy sector lobbyists than
those who voted for the bill.28 Others see splits in the “once-monolithic
oil and gas industry” potentially improving the prospects for climate
legislation.29 Reporters note that “onetime allies in the utility sector, like
Exelon, which operates low-emission nuclear plants, and the Southern
Company, a big consumer of coal, find themselves on opposite sides of
the debate over renewable energy.”30 BP succeeded in stopping the flow
from the damaged wellhead on July 15, 2010.31 A week later, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid abandoned plans to take up comprehensive
climate change legislation before the 2010 elections.32 The Gulf of Mexico
appears to be recovering rapidly from the massive spill, although
environmental concerns persist.33 This crisis appears to have become a
wasted opportunity, and using a divide-and-conquer strategy may be
challenging given the current political climate. Nonetheless, climate
change mitigation continues to be an important issue, and cap-andtrade legislation has gotten further politically than carbon taxes.

26. John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a Gulf
Spill that Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A18, available at 2010WLNR
9862622.
27. Open Congress for the 111th United States Congress, H.R. 2454—American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/show
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
28. Legislators Opposed to Climate Bill Get Double the Funds from Energy Sector,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/06/legislators-opposed-to-climate.html (June 29,
2009, 13:20).
29. John Broder & Jad Mouawad, Energy Firms Find No Unity on Climate Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 20633313.
30. Id.
31. Clifford Krauss, With Little Fanfare, Well is Plugged with Cement, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A13, available at 2010 WLNR 15659514.
32. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate
Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15, available at 2010 WLNR 14692917.
33. Leslie Kaufman & Shaila Dewan, Oiled Gulf May Defy Direst Predictions,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at D1, available at 2010 WLNR 18202317.
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II. HISTORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
Scientists have long been aware of the issue of human-caused climate
change.34 Large-scale action to slow climate change began in 1988 with
the establishment of the IPCC, an independent body under the auspices
of the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations
Environment Program.35 In 1992, the United Nations adopted the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 1994, the
UNFCCC entered into force after receiving its 50th ratification. The
United States is a party to the UNFCCC. The United States did not take
the next step—it did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which was added to
the UNFCCC in 1997. While the UNFCCC set out a framework, the Kyoto
Protocol required actual emission reductions. Under the administration
of President George W. Bush, the United States refused to agree to the
Kyoto Protocol, which was nonetheless adopted in 2005 after Russia
decided to ratify.36
The implementation of the Kyoto protocol stimulated the development
of national and regional greenhouse gas (GHG) trading systems, most
prominently the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EUETS). The EU-ETS, a carbon cap-and-trade system, was developed to
reduce the economic costs of meeting the European Union’s Kyoto
target of eight percent CO2 reduction by 2012.37 The UNFCCC notes
34. In 1898, Svante Arrhenius, the Swedish chemist warned that CO2 emissions
could change the world’s climate. ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE HIGH STAKES
BATTLE OVER THE EARTH’S THREATENED CLIMATE 176 (1997).
35. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The First Ten
Years 12 (2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years
_en.pdf.
36. Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, BBC NEWS Feb. 16, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/16/newsid_4930000/4930554.stm.
37. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
October 2003 established a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. (Council Directive 2003/87, art. 1,
2003 (L 275) 1 (EC)), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/
implementation_en.htm. The 8 percent collective reduction figure applies to the 15 countries
that were EU members in 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
UK. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME 2009 EDITION (2009) 14, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
climat/pdf/brochures/etsen.pdf. See also Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping
with Climate Change 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS5095, 2009),
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK
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the importance of carbon markets, stating that they help reduce the
overall cost of reducing GHG emissions in three ways: 1) by enabling
companies to purchase emission reductions at the lowest cost; 2) by
allowing companies that are cleaner and more efficient to profit from
their technologies and practices by selling excess allowances; and 3) by
lowering transaction costs by making it easier for buyers and sellers of
emission credits to connect.38
The EU-ETS, which began trading in 2005, is the world’s largest
carbon market.39 The EU-ETS is being implemented in three phases.40
The first phase of the EU-ETS, which ran from January 1, 2005, to
December 31, 2007, included approximately 10,000 large industrial plants
in the power generation, iron and steel, glass, brick, and pottery industries,
but excluded the transport sector. Operators of these facilities received
emission allowances good for a one-year period, based on a share of a
national cap. The assigned operator could either use the allowance or
sell any unused portion to other covered facilities. At least 95 percent of
the allowances in the first phase were given to the affected operators.41
The EU-ETS covers about 40 percent of the greenhouse gas sources for
the EU.42
The second phase, which began on January 1, 2008, and will run
through December 31, 2012, features a tighter cap, reducing emissions
allowances 6.5 percent below the 2005 level. The participants are the 27
member states of the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.43
Each Member of the EU must submit a National Allowance Plan (NAP)
that lays out its allocation scheme under the ETS, including individual
allocations to each affected unit.44 These plans must be approved by the
=64165421&theSitePK=469372&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_200910
26142624.
38. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Uniting On Climate Change: A
guide to the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 32 (2007), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/unitingonclimate_eng.pdf.
39. Nathanial Gronewold, Traders are Up and Down Over Latest Version of Climate
Bill, N.Y. TIMES CLIMATEWIRE, May 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/05/14/
14climatewire-traders-are-up-and-down-over-latest-version-70468.html; see also George
Daskalakis and Raphael N. Markellos, Are the European Carbon Markets Efficient?, 17 REV.
FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (“[t]wo years after its initiation, the EU ETS accounted
for almost 97% of the global exchange-based carbon trading with an annual turnover in
2006 exceeding $24.4 billion.”).
40. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 8.
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id. at 7. The 27 countries in the EU are the EU-15 (see note 7) plus Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Collectively, these 27 countries are known as the EU-27.
44. LARRY PARKER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
(ETS): KYOTO AND BEYOND CRS-3, CRS REP. RL34150 (updated Nov. 24, 2008).
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European Commission (EC) and must guarantee the eight-percent GHG
reduction under Kyoto.45 After review, the EC reduced the proposed
NAPs by an average 10.5 percent to increase the likelihood of meeting
the Kyoto target.46 During the second phase, emissions of nitrous oxide
from the production of nitric acid are also included. At least 90 percent
of the allowances in the second phase will be given to operators.47 In
2012, emissions from civil aviation will be included.
The third phase, which will run from January 1, 2013, to December
31, 2020, will feature an EU-wide cap, and include additional emission
sources. The initial cap will be set at the mid-point emissions level of
Phase 2, and decrease by 1.74 percent each year until 2020, resulting in a
21 percent reduction in allowances from 2005 levels. After 2013, the
scheme will move towards auctioning allowances, but under certain
circumstances the Member States may be able to grant power plants up
to 70 percent of their allowances for free in 2013, decreasing to zero
percent for free by 2020.48
In the United States, the debate has been framed as cap-and-trade or
carbon taxes. However, in Europe, carbon taxes preceded cap-and-trade
and continue to exist together with the EU-ETS.49 The Nordic countries
were the first adopters of carbon taxes: Finland and Sweden in 1990,
Norway in 1991, and Denmark in 1992.50 The Netherlands, Slovenia,
Germany, and the UK followed with their own carbon taxes.51 Carbon
taxes are a form of energy tax,52 and all 27 of the countries in the EU
have some form of energy tax.53 The EC, the governing body for the
EU, issued several directives—in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2003—
recommending the use of energy taxation to address climate change.54

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 9.
48. EU-ETC 2009, supra note 38, at 17.
49. See Mikael Skou Andersen, Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing
and Trading Carbon: Some European Experiences, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 61, 80 (2008).
50. Andersen, supra note 50, at 63.
51. Id.
52. Carbon taxes are measured in emission units, while energy taxes are measured
in fuel volume or energy units.
53. Energy, Transport and Environmental Indicators, EUROSTAT, 159 (2009), available
at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-09-001/EN/KS-DK-09-001EN.PDF.
54. Stefan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-based Energy Taxes in European
Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL L. 31, 33–34 (2008).
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The 2003 Energy Taxation Directive established a EU-wide minimum
energy tax levels to be imposed through national law.55 Energy tax
revenues in the EU vary between 1.6 (Belgium) and 3.9 percent (Slovenia)
of gross domestic product.56 Between 1990 and 2005, energy related
CO2 emissions declined in Europe by 3 percent, while increasing in the
U.S. by 20 percent.57 Per capita emissions declined by 6.7 percent over
the same time period in the EU, and are less than half of those in the
U.S.58 The higher per capita emissions in the U.S. are driven by lower
efficiency, particularly in the transport sector.59 As the EU-ETS did not
come into operation until 2005, most of the EU GHG reductions cannot
be credited to the EU-ETS. A 2004 survey of CO2 based taxes found
that they had contributed to the reduction of emissions.60 Dr. Mikael
Skou Andersen notes, however, that “evaluating the impact of carbonenergy taxes on CO2 emissions is complicated because taxes in certain
sectors have replaced pre-existing energy taxes, but now come under a
different name and with a modified tax base—carbon content rather than
gigajoules.”61
In Europe, interest has shifted from new carbon taxes towards a more
complete reliance on the EU-ETS cap-and-trade system.62 The United
Kingdom’s Climate Change levy, enacted in 2001, was the last carbon
tax enacted in the EU.63 France considered a carbon tax in 2009, but
abandoned the proposal due to political and legal obstacles.64 Ireland is
55. See Council Directive 2003/96, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 54 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:EN:PDF
(prohibiting levels of taxation for specified energy products and electricity from being below
prescribed minimum levels of taxation).
56. Eurostat, supra note 54, at 160.
57. Energy and Environment Report 2008, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EEA),
10 (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2008_6.
58. EEA Report, supra note 58, at 83.
59. Id.
60. WTO-UNEP Report: Trade and Climate Change, DTI/1188/GE, (2009) (prepared
by Ludivine Tamiotti et al.).
61. Anderson, supra note 50, at 65.
62. Speck, supra note 55, at 56.
63. A general guide to Climate Change Levy, HM Revenue & Customs, July 2010,
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb
=true&_pageLabel=pageExcise_ShowContent&id=HMCE_CL_000290&property
Type=document#P28_2162. Accord Tamiotti et al., supra note 61, at 130 n.12 (stating that
Switzerland, which is not an EU member, enacted a carbon tax on emissions from imported
energy in 2008). See CO2 levy on heating fuels to be introduced as of January 2008,
THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION, June 28, 2007, available at
http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=13369 (Since 2008,
Switzerland has had a tax on CO2 emissions from imported heating fossil fuels (e.g., heating
oil, natural gas, coal, petroleum coke)).
64. See James Kanter and Matthew Saltmarsh, More in Europe Look to Carbon
Tax to Curb Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, (stating that French president Nicolas
Sarkozy unveiled a proposal to tax carbon at 17 Euro per ton); Gabriele Parussini,
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currently considering a carbon revenue levy, which is essentially an income
tax on the value of free ETS allowances.65 Some European governments
are considering repealing carbon and energy taxes on industries covered
by the EU-ETS.66 Dr. Andersen expects CO2 emissions to increase if
carbon costs decrease by the amount of the tax relief. The additional
emissions would need to be offset by additional allowances, causing an
increase in the price of ETS allowances offsetting the value of the tax
relief.67
The United States is lagging far behind Europe in its climate change
efforts. Only two cities in the U.S.—Boulder, Colorado68 and San Francisco,
California69— have enacted a carbon tax. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) is a functioning cap-and-trade program covering power
plant emissions across several Northeastern states.70 The Western Climate
Initiative (WCI)71 and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord (MGGRA)72 are still in the planning stages. At the federal level,
the first comprehensive climate change bill, the American Clean Energy
and Security Act (ACES, a.k.a. Waxman-Markey), passed the House of
Representatives on June 26, 2009.73 Both cap-and-trade and a carbon
tax will increase the cost of carbon-intensive activities and thus create
incentives to conserve energy, improve energy efficiency, and adopt clean-

France Plans New Version of Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2010 (describing the
bill’s rejection by the Constitutional Council on grounds it violated equitable principles
by having too many exemptions); Matthew Saltmarsh, France Abandons Plan for Carbon
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010.
65. Carbon Revenue Levy Bill 2010 (2010), available at http://www.oireachtas.
ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2010/2810/b2810d.pdf.
66. Andersen, supra note 50, at 83.
67. Id.
68. Boulder voters pass first energy tax in the nation, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.
bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6136&Itemid=169.
69. Kelly Zito, Air Quality Board to Fine Bay Area Polluters, S.F. CHRON., May
22, 2008, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-05-22/news/17155215_1_carbondioxide-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
70. RGGI States’ First CO2 Auction Off to a Strong Start, RGGI Inc., Sept. 29,
2008, available at www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_press_9_29_2008.pdf (stating the RGGI held
its first carbon auction on Sept. 28, 2008).
71. A Comprehensive Initiative, Western Climate Initiative, http://www.western
climateinitiative.org/. (The WCI issued the initial phase of its design recommendations on
Sept. 23, 2008. Its first compliance period begins in 2012).
72. Report, Final Recommendations of the Advisory Group, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE
GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, May 2010, http://www.midwesternaccord.org/Accord_Final
_Recommendations.pdf.
73. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
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energy technologies. A carbon cap sets an absolute emission quantity
limitation while a carbon tax limits the cost of carbon emission reduction.74
While there are many reasons to prefer carbon taxes75 to a cap-and-trade
system, and many do prefer carbon taxes,76 the most promising legislative
solution is cap-and-trade. In a choice between the perfect, the good, and
the planet, I choose the good of the planet.77 The next step is to review
common elements in a cap-and-trade system, and then consider how a
cap-and-trade system would affect the existing tax system.
III. COMMON ELEMENTS OF CAP-AND-TRADE
While cap-and-trade programs vary in their details, they all contain
three essential elements: 1) the “cap,” which represents the annual
allowable emissions of the targeted pollutant; 2) the allocation of rights,
called allowances or permits, to emit the pollutant, which may be auctioned
or given away; and 3) the “trade,” which requires the development of a
secondary market where allowances may be bought and sold. Cap-andtrade programs also utilize additional features such as offsets, banking,
borrowing, and safety values. Offset provisions allow market participants
to substitute investment in pollution mitigating activities for pollution
allowances. Banking permits market participants to carry over unused
permits to future years. Borrowing allows market participants to “borrow”
allowances, rather than purchasing them. Safety values may apply in the
74. See Roberta F. Mann, Waiting to Exhale: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51
AM U.L. REV. 1135, 1209 (2002).
75. Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and
Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,118, 10,122 (2009) (“A carbon tax is better
than a cap-and-trade system because of its simplicity, transparency, efficiency, and certainty
[of cost].”).
76. See Mann, supra note 76; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Our Epic Foolishness, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A27; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and David M. Uhlmann, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming
than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. L. REV. 3 (2009); Bruce Bartlett, A Carbon Tax is Better
Than Cap-and-Trade, FORBES.COM (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/05/obamacarbon-tax-capand-trade opinionscolumnists_republicans_print.html; Gilbert E. Metcalf and
David A. Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009);
Michael Waggoner, How and Why to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
1 (2008); Ralph Nader and Toby Heaps, We Need A Global Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2008, at A17; Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Real Generation X, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2008, at WK10; Carbon Tax & 100% Dividend vs. Tax & Trade*: Testimony of
James E. Hansen 4273 Durham Road, Kintnersville, PA to Committee on Ways and Means
United States House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.
columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2009/20090226_WaysAndMeans.pdf; Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New
Agenda for Global Warming, 3 ECON. VOICE, July 2006, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1210&context=ev.
77. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Perfect, the Good, the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2009, at A23 (“So opponents of the proposed legislation [Waxman-Markey] have to ask
themselves whether they’re making the perfect the enemy of the good. I think they are.”).
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case of volatility in pollution allowance markets. If a safety valve is
triggered, the government will sell additional allowances at a specified
safety valve price. Recent legislative proposals have included many or all
of the foregoing elements. To the extent that particular elements pose
either direct or indirect tax issues, they will be discussed below. Finally,
the goal of a cap-and-trade program is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. This paper will also consider the possibility that certain tax
provisions may enhance or conflict with that goal.
IV. THE CAP
The imposition of a cap itself has no direct interaction with the tax
system. A cap without trading would not create any new asset to be
accounted for under the tax system. A federal cap-and-trade program
will affect the tax system in two broad indirect ways: 1) it will alter the
effectiveness of energy tax incentives contained in the tax system under
current law, and 2) alter the distributive pattern of tax burdens as a capand-trade program is likely to impose a higher proportional costs on
poor households. A carbon tax regime raises the same issues, and would
similarly increase the cost of carbon-intensive energy. A cost increase is
the essential part of any carbon mitigation system; the price signal
reduces demand. The cap is the primary cost driver for a cap-and-trade
system, so the cap will influence effectiveness of existing tax incentives.
The costs imposed by the cap will likely fall disproportionately on lower
income persons. The distributional inequity could be ameliorated by
adjustments to the income and payroll tax systems. This paper will first
address the interaction between the cap and the tax incentives for energy
and then discuss possibilities for evening the distributional burden.
V. TAX INCENTIVES
Before 2007, the majority of energy subsidies provided through the
Internal Revenue Code benefited the use of traditional fossil fuels. After
2007, renewable energy began receiving the majority of the tax benefits
for energy, but fossil fuel sources still receive a significant amount of
support through the tax system.78 Use of fossil energy results in greenhouse

78. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Taxing Energy in the United States: Which Fuels Does the
Tax Code Favor?, MANHATTAN INST. ENERGY POL’Y & ENV’T 13 (2009) [hereinafter Metcalf,
Tax Favored Fuels], available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/eper_04.htm.
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gas (GHG) emissions, although the magnitude of the emissions depends on
the particular fossil fuel source.79 Market mechanisms designed to reduce
GHG emissions tend to increase the cost of using fossil fuel based energy.
Tax subsidies tend to decrease the cost of the subsidized product. Hence, it
is possible that a cap-and-trade program could reduce the effectiveness of
fossil fuel tax subsidies while increasing the effectiveness of renewable
energy subsidies. However, the interaction between a cap-and-trade program
and a particular fuel subsidy is likely to be more complex depending
upon the nature of the market for the fuel in question.80
Tax incentives, also called tax expenditures or subsidies, reduce cost
and convey benefit by reducing the tax burden on those who engage in
the preferred activity.81 Tax incentives may assume different forms.
They may be in the form of tax credits, which reduce tax liability dollar
for dollar. They may be in the form of reduced tax rates on income from
the preferred activity. They may provide additional deductions, which
reduce taxable income. They may be in the form of accelerated deductions,
which convey benefit by reducing taxable income more rapidly than the
normal rule.
Oil and gas tax preferences in the Code include the credit for enhanced oil
recovery costs,82 the marginal well tax credit,83 expensing of intangible
drilling costs,84 the deduction for qualified tertiary injectants,85 percentage
depletion for oil and natural gas,86 and a shortened amortization period

79. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Environment FAQs—Energy
Information Administration, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ask/environment_faqs.asp (last visited
Oct. 13, 2010) (For example, per million Btu generated, the following pounds of CO2 are
emitted: gasoline—156; bituminous coal—205; natural gas—117).
80. See Robert M. Gordon, Matthew P. Haskins & James G. Rafferty, Tax Issues
Associated with Climate Change Legislation, ABA TAX SECTION, Sept. 25, 2009, http://
meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/TX316500/newsletterpubs/ABATax
_Climate_Change_Legislation.ppt (2009).
81. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006)
(tax expenditures are “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”); A Reconsideration of
Tax Expenditure Analysis, JOINT STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110th Cong. 9 (2008)
[hereinafter JCX-37-08] (tax subsidy is defined as “a specific tax provision that is
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a
hypothetical ‘normal’ tax), and that collects less revenue than does the general rule.”).
See Roberta F. Mann, Back to the Future: Recommendations and Predictions for Greener
Tax Policy, 88 OR. L. REV. 355, 358–69 (2009) (a more detailed explanation of the tax
expenditure budget and the recent modifications to the Joint Committee methodology).
82. I.R.C. § 43 (2010).
83. I.R.C. § 45I (2010).
84. I.R.C. § 263(c) (2010).
85. I.R.C. § 193(a) (2010).
86. I.R.C. § 613(a) (2010).
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for geological and geophysical costs.87 Working interests in oil and gas
property also benefit by exemption from the passive activity loss rules,
which limit the deductibility of expenses from many passive investments.88
Domestic oil and gas production activities qualify for the deduction for
domestic production activities.89 The President’s fiscal year 2010 budget
proposes eliminating several of the tax benefits for oil and gas.90 If the
effect of the particular oil and gas subsidy is to favor domestically produced
oil and gas over foreign oil and gas, then a cap-and-trade system would
not alter such a relationship, which is based on a world market price for
oil.91 The cost of both domestic and foreign oil would be increased by
cap-and-trade, and the domestically produced oil would continue to have
a cost advantage relative to foreign oil. If the tax incentive equally benefits
foreign and domestically produced oil, then the subsidy would have the
effect of negating the cost increase due to cap-and-trade, and would
restrain the desired shift to alternative fuels. The deduction for tertiary
injectants arguably encourages the sequestration of CO2, so may be viewed
as consistent with the goals of a cap-and-trade program. On the other
hand, the cap-and-trade program itself, if it included offset provisions,
would encourage using CO2 as a tertiary injectant, so the additional
subsidy provided by the deduction may not be necessary.
Coal, the most carbon intensive fuel, also receives tax benefits, including
investment tax credits for clean coal92 and coal gasification projects93 as
well as production tax credits for Indian coal 94 and refined coal.95
Subsidizing investment in clean coal technologies may ease the transition to
a carbon-neutral energy system, as clean coal technologies facilitate the
use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques. Tax subsidies for
CCS technologies may be an appropriate means of smoothing the
economic transition. On the other hand, some may view continuing to
subsidize coal as counter to the goal of shifting to a renewable energy

87. I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) (2010).
88. I.R.C. § 469(a)(1), (c)(3)(A) (2010).
89. I.R.C. § 199(a)(1)(A), (d)(9)(A) (2010).
90. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OIL AND GAS TAX PROVISIONS: A CONSIDERATION
OF THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 2009).
91. See Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 1354, 1356.
92. I.R.C. § 48A(a) (2010).
93. I.R.C. § 48B(a) (2010).
94. I.R.C. § 45(a)-(c)(9) (2010).
95. I.R.C. § 45(a)-(c)(7) (2010).
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based economy.96 As imported coal97 is not a significant factor in U.S.
energy generation, domestic subsidies reduce the price of coal-fired
energy and would negate the cost increase due to cap-and-trade.
The marginal cost of cap-and-trade depends on the design elements of
the scheme, such as the level of the emissions cap and the permissible
sources of emission reductions (or offsets). Those features of cap and
trade also have consequences for the scheme’s interaction with existing
tax incentives for renewable energy sources. The relationship depends
on whether the emissions reductions efforts occur inside the United
States or abroad.
Various sources of renewable and alternative energy receive federal
tax subsidies, primarily in the form of production tax credits98 and/or
investment tax credits.99 Qualified energy sources for the renewable
electricity production credit include wind, closed-loop biomass, openloop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy (placed in service before
2006), small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower
production, and marine and hydrokinetic energy. Homeowners can
receive personal tax credits for installing certain equipment that uses
solar, wind, or geothermal power.100 There is also a production credit
for new nuclear power. 101 The investment tax credit applies to solar,
geothermal, fuel cell, combined heat and power, and small wind electricity
generation projects. There is an investment tax credit for property used
in a qualified advanced energy manufacturing process.102
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) also includes tax subsidies for
conservation of energy.103 For example, homeowners may receive tax
credits for insulating their homes or installing more efficient heating
systems.104 Consumers purchasing alternative fuel vehicles may be eligible
for tax credits.105 Producers of energy-efficient appliances may be eligible
for a tax credit.106 Owners of commercial property may receive a tax
96. See Roberta F. Mann, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives
Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 GLOBAL BUS.
& DEV. L.J. 111 (2006).
97. FRED FREME, U.S. COAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 2008 REVIEW 1 (U.S. Energy
Information Administration 2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/tbl1.html.
98. I.R.C. § 45 (West 2000).
99. I.R.C. § 48 (West 2009).
100. I.R.C. § 25(d) (West 2009).
101. I.R.C. § 45(j) (West 2009).
102. I.R.C. § 25(c) (West 2009).
103. Tax Expenditures for Energy Production and Conservation: Before the S. Comm.
On Finance (2009) (statement of Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation), available at http://www.
jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3555.
104. I.R.C. § 25(c) (West 2009).
105. I.R.C. §§ 30(b), (d) (West 2009).
106. I.R.C. § 45(m) (West 2008).
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deduction for certain energy-efficient commercial building property
expenditures.107 Taxpayers may exclude from taxable income any
amount received from a public utility for the installation of an energy
conservation measure.108 Energy conservation measure means any
installation or modification primarily designed to reduce consumption of
electricity or to improve the management of energy with respect to a
dwelling unit. In addition, many States provide tax incentives for renewable
energy production and conservation.109
If the cap-and-trade program only allows domestic reductions to count,
then existing tax incentives for low-carbon energy and conservation would
be factored into the market price of carbon allowances. By making lowcarbon energy less costly, the tax incentives will lower the cost of carbon
allowances by an equivalent amount. In effect, the tax incentives will shift
a portion of the cost of abatement to taxpayers and away from electricity
ratepayers or other energy consumers. A carbon tax scheme, in contrast,
does not automatically adjust for changing abatement costs, but instead
must be adjusted, either by design or regulation.110 If the cap-and-trade
scheme allows foreign emission reduction credits, at least some of the
emission reductions will occur outside the U.S. As U.S. tax incentives
do not affect the marginal cost of abatement abroad, the domestic incentives
would no longer affect the price of carbon allowances. Both the Senateproposed American Power Act and the House-passed ACES allow use of
international allowances.111 Some may argue that subsidies for renewable
energy will be redundant if cap-and-trade legislation increases the cost
of fossil energy.112 Others may argue that incentives for renewable energy
are still important because the technology for developing those energy
sources is still in the early stages of development and because industry
structure and regulation weaken incentives for investment.113 Consumer
107. I.R.C. § 179(d) (West 2008).
108. I.R.C. § 136 (1997).
109. For a helpful database of State renewable energy and conservation incentives,
see www.dsire.org.
110. Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 33.
111. See Pew Ctr. For Global Climate Change, Comparison of the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey) and the American Power Act (KerryLiberman) 8 (June 2010), pew-comparison-matrix-wm-and-kl_0.pdf.
112. See Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 27.
113. CBO Study, Fed. Climate Change Programs: Funding History and Policy Issues 15
(2010) (“Notably, difficulties in engaging in a coordinated collected effort and sorting
out the question of which consumers ultimately will bear the cost of new facilities could
decrease or slow investments in renewable-energy generators and the transmission lines
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incentives for conservation may still be required because the price signals
from cap-and-trade may not be adequately reflected in consumer response.114
On the other hand, pricing carbon is more efficient than subsidizing
particular sources of energy.115 All tax incentives are not created equal,
and different sources of energy receive markedly different levels of
preference.116 It is particularly hard to incentivize low cost energy saving
methods through tax benefits. As one study observes: “[t]here is a tax
credit to encourage people to reduce consumption of home heating oil by
installing solar-powered heating units, but there is no similar incentive to
turn down the thermostat or put on a sweater, even though doing so
could reduce GHG emissions at lower cost than installing solar-powered
heating units.”117 Significantly, tax incentives inevitably involve the
government picking “technology winners.” Professor Michael Waggoner
asks, “[H]ow can the government determine whether subsidies to electric
cars or wind generation or efficiency or something else will be more
effective? We would like to believe that legislation is the product of the
combined wisdom of the legislators, but it may be more realistic to consider
legislation as the product of trading votes and political power.”118
VI. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF CAP-AND-TRADE
Most cap-and-trade schemes do not impose emissions caps on
individuals. Instead, as in the EU-ETS and both current U.S. cap-andtrade proposals, the emissions cap covers power generators and fossil
fuel producers and distributors.119 Although the incidence of the cap
does not fall on individual consumers, households will bear the ultimate

necessary to carry power from wind farms or solar arrays to densely populated and
industrial areas where the electricity is consumed.”).
114. CBO Study, Fed. Climate Change Programs: Funding History and Policy Issues
14–15 (2010) (explaining that builders and landlords often make the decision about
which household appliances to purchase and about how much insulation a dwelling will
have, while the buyers and tenants pay the monthly energy bills. The study concludes
that “in the trade-off between energy efficiency and initial cost, the divergent incentives
of landlords and developers and those of tenants and home buyers might not encourage socially
optimal choices.”).
115. CBO Study, supra note 115, at 22.
116. Metcalf, supra note 77, at 9. See also Joint Comm. on Taxation, Tax Expenditures
for Energy Prod. And Conservation, JCX-25-09, at 117 (Apr. 21, 2009).
117. CBO Study, supra note 115, at 22.
118. Michael J. Waggoner, Critique of U.S. House Bill 2454 on Climate Change, 2
AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 61, 64 (2010). See also John M. Broder, With Something for
Everyone, Climate Bill Passed, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
07/01/us/politics/01climate.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=john+broder&st=nyt (noting that the bill
was full of special interest favors).
119. Pew Ctr. Comparison, supra note 111, at 1.
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costs of cap-and-trade.120 Energy producers facing the cap may make
their own emissions reductions by choosing less carbon intensive fuels
or operating more efficiently, passing the costs of new equipment and
higher priced fuel on to their customers. Alternatively, energy producers
can purchase emissions permits and pass the costs on to their consumers.
On average, lower-income households pay a larger share of their income
toward the costs of residential energy and transportation fuel. A
household’s energy burden refers to the amount of funds spent on
residential energy relative to income. The poorest households have a
median energy burden of 15.3%; low-income households have a median
energy burden of 9.5%, while non-low-income households have a
median energy burden of 3.1%.121 A cap-and-trade program that does
not address the increased costs faced by low-income households could
result in the lowest income group bearing a cost almost five times that of
the highest income group.122 Interestingly, the consumption patterns of
the highest income households result in more than three times the carbon
emissions of the lowest income households, although representing a
much lower proportion of the highest income households’ incomes.123
The cost impact will occur whether the emission permits are allocated
for free or auctioned, as the cap itself will restrict the ability to use carbonemitting fuels. If permits are auctioned, it will generate government
revenue that could be distributed to disproportionately affected households.
Congress could use a variety of options to reduce the cap-and-trade
program’s disparate impact on low-income households. Policies that
disproportionately burden the poor are called regressive; policies that
impose greater burdens on the wealthy are called progressive. Tax
related options to address cap-and-trade’s regressivity include: energy
tax credits for low and/or middle-income households with earned income or
120. Corbett A. Grainger & Charles D. Kolstad, Who Pays a Price on Carbon?, 46
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 359, 360 (2010).
121. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LIBBY PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40841,
ASSISTING HOUSEHOLDS WITH THE COSTS OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: OPTIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2009).
122. See Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative
Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 2, 6–7 (Res. for the Future, Paper No.
RFF DP 09-17-REV, 2009), available at http://rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.
aspx?PublicationID=20778.
123. Grainger & Kolstad, supra note 121, at 12 tbl.4 (comparing mean household
emissions for Quintile 1 (27.47) with those for Quintile 5 (93.96)). On a per capita basis,
the lowest income households emitted 15.2 CO2 equivalents while the highest income
households emitted 30.3.
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qualifying retirement income, adding an energy component to the
Earned Income Tax credit, and reducing Social Security payroll taxes.
Considerations in choosing a method include: the ability to reach
households, administrative feasibility, consumer flexibility, tailoring benefits
for household size and income, accounting for regional differences,
and promoting energy efficiency.
Using either the income tax system or the payroll tax system would
reach working households. If the cap-and-trade program does not generate
auction revenue, cutting taxes would increase the deficit. Cutting payroll
taxes could threaten the viability of the Social Security system. Using
the tax system to deliver funds would not require a new administrative
infrastructure, although it would place additional burdens on the tax
system. By reducing tax liability or creating a refund, a tax credit would
provide funds that could be used by households in a flexible way to
meet energy needs or for any other purpose. As the income tax system
already tracks household size by dependency exemptions, the benefit
could be easily tailored. Accounting for regional differences in energy
prices would require additional information to be submitted, and possibly
third party reporting by energy providers. As an important part of the
effectiveness of cap-and-trade is the delivery of a price signal, e.g., higher
GHG emitting fuels should cost more, reducing the price by redistribution
of funds weakens the effectiveness of the program. If funds are tied to
energy expenditures, like the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP), it may lead to higher energy use by low-income
households.124 The House-passed bill, ACES, would use the proceeds
from auctioning 15 percent of the allowances to make cash payments to
eligible low-income households to reimburse them for the estimated loss
in purchasing power resulting from the legislation.125 The Senate proposal,
the American Power Act, would use the proceeds from the auction of
approximately 12 percent of the allowances to provide an energy refund
and the working families refundable credit.126
Some legislative proposals have included an equal per capita dividend
of cap-and-trade auction revenues,127 based on the theory that all
households will bear the burden of higher energy costs and thus should

124. For example, for fiscal year 1997, the average LIHEAP household consumed about
5.7 percent more energy than the average low income household. See ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN
ENERGY MARKETS 1999: ENERGY TRANSFORMATION AND END USE 8–9 (2000), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy1/pdf/sroiaf(2000)02.pdf.
125. See PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 111, at 3.
126. Id.
127. The Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877,
111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009).
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share the benefits of government revenues generated by auction of capand-trade permits. The tax consequences of such payments should be
considered. Such payments are similar to Alaska’s permanent fund
dividends, which are a per capita distribution of a portion of Alaska’s oil
revenues to Alaska residents. Alaska permanent fund dividends are taxable
income for federal purposes.128 On the other hand, energy conservation
subsidies provided by public utilities are not taxed to the recipients.129
While the cost of cap-and-trade permits should have the effect of
encouraging energy conservation, the receipt of cap-and-trade dividends
would not encourage energy conservation. Surprisingly, one study finds
that per capita dividends to be the most progressive way to mitigate the
regressive effect of carbon pricing.130 Another study found that taxing
the per capita dividend produced an even more progressive effect.131
Behavioral research suggests that making a cap-and-trade scheme fair
to the poor may be much more complex. Reviewing proposals to
mitigate the disproportionate impact of carbon pricing, Professors Brian
Galle and Manuel Utset observe that rebates may be ineffective in easing
the burden on the poor.132 They note that an end of the year rebate does
not help a household face increased expenses if the household does not
have adequate liquidity to meet the ongoing expenses or ability to borrow at
a reasonable cost.133 Moreover, the problem cannot be easily solved by
front-loading the rebate (“prebate”) as immediately available funds may
induce lower income households to over-consume carbon intensive
products.134 Their interesting proposal to overcome these problems is a
self-directed debit card.135 The debate about the most effective way to
mitigate the regressive effect of carbon pricing mirrors the debate about

128. Permanent Fund Dividend Division: Tax Reporting, STATE OF ALASKA-PERMANENT
FUND DIVIDEND DIVISION, http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/taxes/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 13,
2010).
129. I.R.C. § 136 (2006).
130. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable
Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change 18 (The Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project,
Discussion Paper No. 2007-12, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/
rc/papers/2007/10carbontax_metcalf/10_carbontax_metcalf.pdf.
131. Burtraw et al., supra note 123, at 14.
132. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Short-Sighted
Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law
Research Paper, Paper #444, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576263.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 43.
135. Id. at 62.
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the most effective means for carbon pricing. It is important to
consider fairness, but as in the design of climate mitigation, the perfect
should not be the enemy of the good.136
A carbon tax, which would also raise prices on energy intensive goods
and services, would likely have effects similar to those described above
on existing tax incentives and poor households. However, a carbon tax
would raise revenue to ameliorate the effects. A cap-and-trade scheme
only raises government revenue when the allowances are auctioned. Both
of the proposals pending in Congress give away the majority of the
allowances, at least in the first years of the programs.137 The Center for
Budget and Policy Priorities concluded, however, that both proposals
adequately met “the goal of protecting the typical household in the
poorest fifth of the population from incurring a financial loss as a result
of policies necessary to fight global warming.”138
VII. THE ALLOWANCES
The second essential element of a cap-and-trade system is the
allowance, or carbon permit. The cap is divided into allowances, each of
which authorizes the holder to emit the applicable unit of carbon, usually
one (metric) ton of CO2 equivalent.139 The scheme is designed so that
allowances are valuable market commodities. A Congressional Research
Service report noted that “allocating allowances is essentially allocating
money with the marketplace determining the exchange rate.”140 Both the
IRS and the recipients of the allowances need to know: 1) whether and
when the initial receipt of allowances constitutes taxable income, 2) the
tax basis of the allowance, 3) whether the cost of acquiring an allowance
is deductible, 4) if the cost of acquiring the allowance is not deductible,
when and if such cost can be recovered through depreciation or amortization,
and 5) how the sale of an allowance will be taxed. This section will cover
the first four issues. The last issue will be covered in the following section
on “trading.”
The first two issues turn on whether the allowances will be freely
allocated or auctioned. The tax considerations are simpler if the permits
136. Id. at 60 (“We do not propose, though, to maintain fairness even if it means the
polar icecaps melt.”).
137. Pew Center for Global Climate Change, supra note 112, at 2–3.
138. DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CENTER FOR BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, HOW LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS WOULD FARE UNDER THE KERRYLIEBERMAN CLIMATE-CHANGE BILL 7 (2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-24-10climate.pdf.
139. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION: TAX CONSIDERATIONS
2 (June 12, 2009), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Joint%20Committee
%20on%20Taxation.pdf.
140. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-27.
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are auctioned. If a power plant pays $100 for the right to emit a ton of
CO2 equivalent in 2012, then under normal tax rules that apply to most
assets, the power plant has acquired an asset with a basis of $100.141 As
the power plant has paid full fair market value, it has no accession to
wealth and thus no taxable income. If the power plant sells the permit
rather than using it, it will calculate its gain or loss using the $100
basis.142 Furthermore, if the cost is deductible, the power plant will have
a $100 deduction.143 If the cost is treated as a capital expenditure, the
amortizable basis will be $100.144
Commentators have argued vigorously that all allowances should be
auctioned.145 Arguments for auctions include that auctions create a level
playing field between existing entities and new firms, and that the
auctions improve market liquidity and transparency.146 President Obama
advocated a cap-and-trade system with 100 percent auctioned allowances
during his Presidential campaign. The primary argument against free
allowances is that they provide a windfall to the firm, which will pass
the cost of restricting carbon on to its customers anyway. Although it
has been argued that free allowances are necessary to reduce cost increases
to consumers, economic analysis shows that free allowances do not prevent
cost increases. Because allowances have economic value, if a firm uses
the allowance to emit carbon, it foregoes the opportunity to cash in by
selling the allowance. Thus, the firm will pass the cost of using the
allowance on to its customers,147 creating wealth for shareholders at the
expense of (generally) poorer customers. It also constrains revenue
available to the government for mitigating the regressive effect of carbon
pricing. The free allocation program under the EU-ETS produced windfalls
for the allowance recipients.148 In the EU scheme, the power producers
succeeded in marking up the market price of electricity to include the
opportunity-cost value of the allowances.149 A research paper by Deutsche

141. See 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (2010).
142. See 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2010).
143. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2010).
144. I.R.C. §§ 263, 167 (2010).
145. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Don’t Give Away the Cap-and-Trade Permits!, 123 TAX
NOTES 613 (May 4, 2009) (also citing five other analysts with similar views, see id. at 618).
146. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-15.
147. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2
EMISSIONS 5 (2007), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf.
148. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-27.
149. Id.
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Bank concluded that the EU-ETS failed as a market mechanism: “the
result is a greenhouse gas reduction scheme that is influenced as much or
more by national policy than by the emissions marketplace.”150
However, as noted above, the bulk of the allowances in either pending
legislative proposal will be freely allocated. As a general principle of
tax law, all benefits received are taxable unless a specific statutory
exclusion applies.151 In addition to the statutory exclusions, unrealized
appreciation and imputed income also escape taxation. Unrealized
appreciation represents the increase in value of assets held by the taxpayer,
which is generally not taxed unless a specific statutory provision requires it
to be taxed.152 Imputed income represents the value of self-performed
services, like mowing your own lawn, or the value of using a durable asset,
like the rental value of your principal residence.153 Freely allocated
carbon permits would appear to be taxable unless specifically excluded
by statute. However, the same would be true of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide (SOx and NOx) permits freely allocated under the Clean Air Act,
and the IRS ruled that no tax results from the receipt of SOx and NOx
permits.154 Thus, it seems at least possible that firms could avoid taxation
on the receipt of carbon permits.
The tax consequences of receipt determine the tax basis of the permits.
If the recipient is taxed on receipt, then the permit’s basis is the amount
taken into income, the fair market value of the permit.155 If the recipient
avoids tax on receipt, then the permit’s basis is zero. An intermediate
option would be permitting receipt of allowances without current tax
consequences, but requiring tax inclusion upon surrender of the permits.156
Except for timing issues, the result of these options would be the same.
Because of the timing issues, however, commentators recommend

150. Id. at CRS-28.
151. Examples include the exclusion for gifts and inheritances, I.R.C. § 102 (2010),
and the exclusion for damages received on account of personal physical injury, I.R.C.
§ 104 (2010).
152. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (2010), requiring securities dealers to recognize unrealized
gains and losses by “marking-to-market” their inventory at the end of each taxable year.
153. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.02 (unrealized appreciation) and ¶ 3.03
(imputed income) (2d ed. 2009).
154. Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15.
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d).
156. This option would be analogous to the receipt of property by a service provider
as compensation. Under IRC § 83(a), the service provider usually has income in the
amount of the fair market value of the property when received. If the property is subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is non-transferable (e.g., a stock option which may
not be transferred until after a number of years of employment), the service provider need not
take the value into income until the restriction is lifted. Alternatively, the service provider may
elect to take the value of the property into income immediately. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2004).
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taxing receipt of free permits.157 Consider the following hypothetical:
Power plant “A” receives a carbon permit for $100. “A” takes $100 into
taxable income. “A” uses the permit in the same taxable year and is
allowed a $100 deduction. The $100 deduction would cancel out the $100
of income, leaving a net income of zero. If “A” had to purchase the
carbon permit on the market, the same result would obtain. Now assume
instead that Power Plant “B” may exclude the $100 value of its carbon
permit from income. When “B” uses the carbon permit, its deduction
will be zero, again leaving a net income of zero. What if “B” could bank
the permit for use in future years? “B” can defer income from the taxfree receipt of the permit by holding the permit and not using it.158 Of
course, “B” would either have to suffer a business decline or spend on
increased efficiency (or offsets) to meet the cap.159 But what if “B” could
also borrow a permit (or borrow money to acquire a permit) to use this
year? Borrowing is not included in taxable income because of the
obligation to repay. “B” could potentially get basis in the borrowed
permit, deduct the cost of the permit and the interest costs, and still defer
the income of the freely allocated permit. “B” can defer the income as long
as the banked permit does not expire. “B” could enter into a forward
contract to sell the permit to another power plant for future use, continuing
to defer taxation until the forward contract is settled.160 Depending on
the flexibility of the cap-and-trade scheme, “B” could reap substantial
value from deferral. Furthermore, the tax preference for banking will
increase the cost of carbon mitigation, because fewer permits will be for
sale and thus will command a higher price.161 The researchers who have
analyzed this issue in detail argue that freely allocated carbon permits

157. See Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and-Trade Environmental Regulation, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 535, 536 (2008) (finding that the income tax can distort decisions whether to save
permits for future use); Gary M. Lucas, Jr., The Taxation of Emissions Permits Distributed for
Free as Part of a Carbon Cap-And-Trade Program, 1 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL.
L. 1, 3 (2010).
158. Lucas, supra note 158, at 16 (noting that if a firm banks its permits, it matters a
great deal whether those permits were included or excluded from income.).
159. Lucas notes that even if B spends on abatement, and then banks the permit, the
likely appreciation in the value of the permit, which will be untaxed, will give B a
substantial benefit. Lucas, supra note 158, at 24.
160. A forward contract is a contract to buy or sell a commodity on a future date for
a set price. It may be cash settled or physically settled. Forward contracts are taxed like
options. The granting of an option does not result in a taxable event to the grantor.
Bittker & McMahon, ¶ 28.01, p. 28–19.
161. Lucas, supra note 158, at 25.
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should result in taxable income for the recipient.162 On the other hand,
Congressional Research Service analysis of the implications of transaction
costs and taxes on sulfur dioxide allowance trading found only limited
reasons to expect any influence of the tax system on allowance trading.163
The experience of the EU-ETS is no help in this regard, as the Phase 1
pilot program did not allow banking. One study concludes that the failure to
allow banking made the EU-ETS less liquid and therefore less efficient.164
The prior discussion assumes that the cost of carbon allowances would
be deductible when used. However, whether the cost of allowances should
be deducted or amortized remains an open question. The allowances
could be treated as an intangible property right—the right to emit carbon.
Intangible assets are generally amortizable over 15 years, if they are
amortizable at all.165 Again, the appropriate answer depends on the details
of the cap-and-trade program. If allowances can only be used in the current
year, then the cost of allowances should be currently deductible.166
The pending proposals both allow unlimited banking of permits.167 The
proposals also allow borrowing. Banking and borrowing mean that permits
may be used beyond the current year. However, the regulations provide
an exception to the general rule of 15-year amortization for rights to a
fixed amount.168 In the case of sulfur dioxide allowances, the IRS allows a
deduction in the year of surrender.169
VIII. OFFSETS
The pending cap-and-trade proposals both allow participants to use
offset investments to meet their obligations under the cap. Carbon tax
advocates cite carbon “leakage” from unreliable offset projects as one of
the reasons to favor carbon taxes over cap-and-trade.170 “In a carbon
bubble, unscrupulous intermediaries may overpromise on offset projects
by selling future credits based on projects that do not yet exist, are not
additional, or which simply do not deliver the promised GHG reductions.
This would not only have financial impacts, but also environmental

162.
163.

See Yale, supra note 158; see also Lucas, supra note 158.
LARRY B. P ARKER & D ONALD W. K IEFER , I MPLEMENTING SULFUR DIOXIDE
ALLOWANCE TRADING: IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSACTION COSTS AND TAXES, CRS REPORT
93-313, Mar. 12, 1993.
164. Daskalakis & Markellos, supra note 40, at 116.
165. I.R.C. § 197 (2004).
166. IRC § 162 (2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994).
167. JASANOFF, supra note 5.
168. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-14(c)(2)(ii) (1971).
169. Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503.
170. See, e.g., MANN, Carbon Tax, supra note 10,121 (noting that offsets and international
credits pose significant compliance issues).
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consequences, as economies fail to meet GHG reduction targets.”171
Carbon offsets are projects that absorb or sequester carbon. The offset
project generates the equivalent of an emission allowance, which could
be sold and traded in the same manner as emission allowances allocated
or sold by a governmental agency. Assume that Power Plant “C” received
permits to emit 100 tons of CO2 equivalents. Power plant “C” planned
to emit 150 tons. “C” could either purchase 50 permits on the market, or
invest in a carbon-offset project that would absorb 50 tons of CO2
equivalents. Both pending proposals allow investment in verified
domestic or international offset projects to partially fulfill participants’
requirements under the cap.172 Under ACES, for example, qualifying
domestic offset projects would include winter cover cropping and
reforestation of unforested land.173 The American Power Act includes
similar agricultural and forestry projects as qualified offsets.174 The
agriculture and the forestry industries each have their own special tax
provisions, so the tax treatment of the offset projects will depend upon
the nature of the project and whether the generation of offsets is the
primary objective of the project.175
The Joint Committee on Taxation identified numerous tax issues relating
to carbon offsets, including:
• How does the taxpayer determine its basis in the offsets?
• Are all costs incurred with respect to the project included in the
basis of the offset where the principal purpose of the project is
to obtain the offset? If allocation is required, how is such
allocation determined?
• When are such costs recognized (e.g., expensed as incurred,
included in basis and recognized when the offset is sold)?
• Are the continued maintenance costs of a project undertaken
primarily to generate offsets deductible as incurred?176

171. Subprime Carbon, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, http://www.foe.org/pdf/Subprime
CarbonReport.pdf.
172. Pew Center Comparison, supra note 5.
173. H.R. 2454, Title V, § 503, 111th Cong. (2009).
174. The American Power Act, Title II, Part D, § 734, (111th Cong., 2d Sess. 2010).
175. For a detailed analysis of tax issues relating to agriculture, see BNA TAX MGT.
PORTFOLIO, INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, CREDITS AND COMPUTATION OF TAX, 505-3rd T.M. VI-B.
For a detailed analysis of tax issues relating to the timber industry, see BNA Tax Mgt.
Portfolio 505-3rd T.M. VI-C.
176. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 16.
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The Joint Committee concluded that the rules governing the treatment
of offset production costs should be coordinated with the rules governing
income inclusion upon receipt of allocated emission allowances.177
IX. THE TRADE
The “trade” part of cap-and-trade is theoretically essential to obtain
carbon emissions reductions at the lowest cost. In theory, covered firms
would be able to identify and compare the cost of self-funded abatement
with the cost of acquiring additional permits from firms that have a
lower cost of abatement. Several tax issues arise. First of which is whether
the carbon allowance is a capital asset or not. The tax consequences of the
sale of any asset depends upon its tax characterization. Sale of capital
assets generally produce capital gains or losses.178 For individuals, longterm capital gain is taxed at a preferential rate, usually 15 percent.179
Capital losses may reduce capital gain, and for individuals only, a limited
amount of ordinary income.180 If the asset is not a capital asset, its sale
produces ordinary income or loss. Inventory and supplies regularly used
in a trade or business are not capital assets.181 The IRS held sulfur dioxide
(SOx) allowances to be capital assets.182 The IRS also ruled that EUETS carbon emission allowances are capital assets.183 Thus, if carbon
allowances are distributed to covered firms for free, the basis is zero.
Upon sale of the allowances, all of the proceeds will be capital gains.
The Joint Committee observed that: “[t]his approach would not provide
parity between taxpayers (non-dealers) that sell allowances and those
that surrender allowances to meet their obligations under a cap-and-trade
system, because the latter would receive an ordinary deduction equal to
their basis in the surrendered allowances.”184 While it is not perfectly
clear what the Joint Committee means by that statement, it appears that
recipients of freely allocated “tax-free” allowances would be placed in a
better financial position by selling, rather than surrendering them. The
IRS has also allowed tax-deferred exchanges of differently dated SOx
allowances under the like-kind exchange rules.185
Determining the tax consequences of receiving and transferring carbon
allowances is simple compared to determining the tax consequences of
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 17.
I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221, 1222 (2006).
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006).
I.R.C. § 1211 (2006).
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), (a)(8) (2006).
Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503, 1992 WL 320322.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200825009 (June 20, 2008), 2008 WL 2469944.
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 19.
I.R.C. § 1031 (2010); Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503.
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financial derivatives based on carbon allowances. Taxation of financial
derivatives is complex because the instruments are complex and sometimes
deliberately opaque. It is difficult to determine the tax ownership of the
underlying asset, which affects tax treatment. It is difficult to determine
whether the income streams from the instrument constitute debt or equity,
which affects tax treatment.186 To some commentators, the carbon market
is the most dangerous part of cap-and-trade.187 The Friends of the Earth
produced a report drawing an analogy between the potential carbon
derivatives market under a cap-and-trade system with the market in
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which led to the burst in the housing
bubble and the collapse of the financial markets in late 2008.188 An
economist finds two dangers in energy derivatives trading: mispricing and
illiquidity.189 She writes, “[l]ike credit derivatives, energy derivatives can
be similar to hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.”190
Derivatives are so called because they derive their value from an
underlying asset, such as a mortgage or a carbon permit. Financial
derivatives include options, forward contracts, futures contracts, and
interest rate swaps.191 Derivatives can represent a long position, meaning
that the value of the derivative fluctuates in the same direction as the value
of the underlying asset. For example, the value of an option to buy stock
(a call option) at $100 per share will increase as the market value of the
stock increases above $100 per share. Derivatives can represent a short
position, meaning that the value of the derivative fluctuates in the opposite
direction as the value of the underlying asset. For example, the value of

186. Debt instruments usually produce interest taxable to the holder at ordinary tax
rates and a deduction for the borrower. I.R.C. § 163 (2010). Equity instruments produce
dividends that may be taxed to the holder at reduced rates and no deduction to the issuer.
I.R.C. § 1(h) (2010). Put-call parity allows financial derivatives to be structured at will to
create debt or equity. See Hans R. Stoll, The Relation Between Put and Call Prices, 44 J.
FIN. 801 (1969). See also Michael Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 61 (2002).
187. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SUBPRIME CARBON? RE-THINKING THE WORLD’S LARGEST
NEW DERIVATIVE MARKET, available at www.foe.org/pdf/SubprimeCarbonReport.pdf.
188. Id. at 4.
189. Chiara Oldani, Energy Derivatives: The Source of the Next Crisis?, THE ICFAI
READER, SPECIAL ISSUE (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1486036.
190. Id. at 4.
191. Jonas Monast ET AL, U.S. Carbon Market Design: Regulating Emission Allowances
as Financial Instruments 7–8 (Duke University Climate Change Policy Partnership,
Paper No. CCPP 09-01, 2009), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ccpp/ccpp_pdfs/
carbon_market_primer.pdf.
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an option to sell stock (a put option) for $100 per share will decline as
the value of the stock increases above $100 per share. Derivatives have
their own vocabulary. A premium is the price paid for purchasing an
option. For example, Homer pays Mr. Burns $10 for the right to purchase
Animatronix stock for $100 per share by December 19. The strike price
is the price paid for exercising an option. If Homer exercises the option,
he will pay a strike price of $100 per share. Most options have an
expiration date, the date by which the option must be exercised or lapse.
If Homer fails to exercise his option by December 19, Mr. Burns will
keep his $10 and Homer loses the right to purchase the stock at the strike
price. Mr. Burns will not be taxed until either Homer exercises the option
or the option lapses. The grant of an option is not generally considered a
realization event under the federal income tax system.192
Derivatives can be used as a hedge to protect businesses from risk.
Company CP makes sweeteners and other products based on corn. CP
purchases a corn futures contract193 that requires it to purchase corn at
$100 per bushel on a date two years in the future. CP has now locked in
the cost of supply at $100 and protected its business from price increases
over $100. In two years, if the price of corn is $250, CP will either buy
corn at $100 (physical settlement) or will receive a $150 payment (cash
settlement). If instead the price of corn is $90, CP will likely cash settle
the contract for $10. If a derivative instrument that would otherwise be a
capital asset, like a corn future, is used as a hedge against business risk,
then the gains and losses recognized on the disposition of that asset will
be treated as ordinary.194
Investors (or speculators, if you prefer) also purchase derivatives. In
essence, a derivative is a wager on which way the price of an asset will
vary.195 In the energy sector, as in the financial sector, the business needing
risk management can become the speculator. A commentator, arguing

192. But see I.R.C. § 1259 (2010) (requiring realization and recognition of gain for
a “short sale against-the-box”). See Lee A. Sheppard, Borrowing All the Way to a
Constructive Sale, 84 TAX NOTES 816 (Aug. 9, 1999).
193. A futures contract is a forward contract (an obligation to buy a commodity for
a specified price on a specified date) that is publicly traded on a futures exchange.
194. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(7) (2010). Generally, to receive ordinary tax treatment the
taxpayer must identify the transaction as a hedging transaction. I.R.C. § 1221(b)(2) (2010).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b) defines a hedging transaction as a transaction entered into in
the ordinary course of business primarily to (inter alia) manage the risk of price changes.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b) (2010).
195. “Overall, we can put hedging and traditional gambling contracts on the same
spectrum. To some extent, they are all contracts that allow people to make profits or
avoid loss from predicting future uncertainties.” CHAO-HUNG CHRISTOPHER CHEN, DIVIDING
HEDGING AND GAMBLING: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 1 (2006).
Chen also notes that insurance contracts fall along this spectrum.
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for regulatory oversight of energy derivative markets, advised policymakers to remember Enron:
“[Enron] started as a provider of natural gas and electricity. Like energy companies
today, it also claimed to use derivatives for hedging. But as it grew, Enron
gradually morphed into what amounted to a giant, and utterly reckless, trading firm.
To put it another way, a benign energy provider that is shielded from regulation
today could in time evolve into a far more malevolent beast, especially as the
line between hedging and trading for profit erodes.”196

The EU-ETS experience raises a cautionary tale. During Phase 1, oil
and natural gas price changes were the most important variable in
determining allowance price changes.197 The Congressional Research
Service notes that “[t]his apparent linkage between allowance price changes
and price changes in two commodities markets raises the possibility of
market manipulation, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments
such as options and futures contracts.”198 Even so, the EU experience
may not foreshadow all the dangers faced by the potential U.S. market in
carbon derivatives. In the EU-ETS, the majority of trades involve the
carbon allowances themselves, not derivatives, and the allowances are
physically settled.199 The U.S. cap-and-trade scheme envisions derivative
trading,200 and unlike the EU-ETS Phase I, both pending legislative
proposals allow significant time-shifting of the carbon allowances.201
As noted above, the use of financial derivatives may allow tax deferral
because the grant of an option or like instrument is not a realization
event. The tax treatment of any derivative instrument depends on many
factors, such as whether the instrument is held in the course of business
or as an investment or whether it is considered to be debt or equity.202

196. Alain Sherter, Financial Reform: Why Shielding Energy Firms From Derivatives
May Be Nuts, BNET, 3 (May 28, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/financial-business/
financial-reformwhy-shielding-energy-firmsfrom derivatives-rules-may-benuts/5929.
197. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-29.
198. Id.
199. Gronewold, supra note 40, at 2.
200. Id. However, Dr. Oldani notes that cash settled derivatives are less likely to
cause an “energy crunch” than physically settled derivatives. Oldani, supra note 191, at 4.
201. Pew Comparison, supra note 111, at 5, 7; see also Jonas Monast, Jon Anda & Tim
Profeta, U.S. Carbon Market Design: Regulating Emissions Allowances as Financial
Instruments, D UKE U NIVERSITY, Feb. 2009, at 8, 15, available at http://www.nicholas.
duke.edu/ccpp/ccpp_pdfs/carbon_market_primer.pdf.
202. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO
TAX TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVES (JCX-21-08), at 12 (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.
financial-spreadbetting.com/tax-derivatives.pdf; see also Kevin J. Liss, The Option
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Congress will have to decide whether to specify the tax treatment of
carbon derivatives or whether to leave the decision to the IRS and the
courts.203 In response to the concerns about carbon market bubbles,
Congress has considered limiting access to the carbon markets to
“registered participants.”204 On the other hand, broader participation by
investors could make the carbon market more efficient and more liquid.
As the Joint Committee on Taxation noted, “Tax rules that make a
secondary market less transparent and/or less liquid could undermine the
efficacy of the cap-and-trade program, which relies on the secondary
markets to allocate the emission allowances efficiently.”205
It is unclear which particular tax rules would make the market less
transparent or liquid. The foregoing discussion may have raised a mental
fog thicker than any greenhouse gas. To attempt to clarify, the tax system
should consider the following issues with respect to trading of carbon
allowances:
• Should investors and firms covered under the cap-and-trade
scheme be treated differently?
• Should participants in the carbon markets be able to defer
gain or loss, and for how long?
• Should explicit tax rules be provided for carbon allowances
and their derivatives, or should Congress rely on the IRS and
the courts?
A carbon tax would raise none of these issues, as it would not create a
new financial instrument.
X. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES
A discussion of the U.S. tax system relating to cross-border business
activities affected by cap-and-trade is beyond the scope of this article.
In general, those issues turn on the characterization of the allowance or

Conundrum in Tax Law: After All These Years, What Exactly is an Option?, 63 TAX LAWYER
307 (2010), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1100/.
203. The Joint Committee observed: “[T]here are dangers inherent in developing
statutory rules for every new financial product. First, instruments can often be replicated
through combinations of other instruments, thereby undoing some of the categorizations
contemplated by new statutes. Second, drawing the line between different instruments
(i.e., assigning one instrument to one cubbyhole, and another to a different one) itself can
be very difficult, and may result in economically similar instruments being taxed quite
differently.” JCX-21-08, supra note 204, at 13.
204. Gronewold, supra note 40, at 1.
205. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION: TAX CONSIDERATIONS
2, at 24 (June 12, 2009).
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derivative for U.S. tax purposes, as covered in the previous discussion.206
International trade issues, however, raise unique concerns. Congress has
tried to use the tax system to accomplish international trade goals for
years, with some unfortunate results.207 The prior disputes with the
World Trade Organization (WTO) involved export-related tax benefits.
The WTO found that those tax benefits were prohibited export subsidies
that violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).208
The tariff on imported ethanol, designed to protect the domestic ethanol
industry, has also been challenged under WTO rules.209 One of the main
political arguments against U.S. participation in climate change mitigation
efforts is the potential impact on the international competitiveness of
U.S. industries.210 Another concern is “carbon leakage.” Carbon leakage
occurs when carbon-intensive industries move from countries with carbon
restrictions to countries with less stringent carbon policies. Carbon
leakage threatens not only competitiveness and domestic jobs, but the
environmental effectiveness of the carbon mitigation scheme.211 In the
U.S., carbon-intensive manufacturing industries such as iron and steel,
aluminum and copper, nonmetal mineral products, paper and pulp, and
basic chemicals, are already facing pressure from international competition,
particularly large emerging economies without carbon emissions
commitments such as China, India, and Brazil.212 These industries produce
more than half of all CO2 emissions from the manufacturing sector.213

206.
207.

Id. at 28–31.
See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TRADE DISPUTE
RELATING TO THE PRIOR-LAW FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION PROVISIONS AND THE PRESENTLAW EXCLUSIONS FOR EXTRA TERRITORIAL INCOME AND A DESCRIPTION OF THESE RULES
(July 26, 2002).
208. Id. at 2–5.
209. Alan Beattie & Sheila McNulty, Green Barricade Trade Faces a New Test as
Carbon Taxes Go Global, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at 7 (stating Brazil has filed a formal
complaint with WTO challenging the tariff). Brazil seeks to have ethanol classified as an
“environmental good” in the Doha Development Round, which would result in tariff
cuts. Id. See also Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax
Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. POL’Y F. 43, 54 (2008).
210. Trevor Houser, Rob Bradley, Britt Childs, Jacob Werksman, & Robert Heilmayr,
Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and U.S. Climate Policy
Design, xv PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & WRI (May 2008)
(leveling_the_carbon_playing_field.pdf).
211. Tamiotti et al., supra note 61, at 99.
212. Houser et al., supra note 212, at xv–xvi.
213. Houser et al., supra note 212, at xvi.
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Measures to avoid competitive disadvantage and reduce carbon leakage
will be a key part of any politically successful climate legislation.
To protect the competitiveness of U.S. products within the U.S., the
measure might attempt to impose the same costs on imported goods as
U.S. climate legislation imposes on domestic production. To protect the
global competitiveness of U.S. businesses, the measure might exclude
goods exported from the U.S. from the domestic carbon pricing scheme.
There are a number of methods to meet these goals, but some of those
methods may be more likely to face challenge under WTO trade rules.214
WTO trade rules require trade measures to comply with nondiscrimination
standards, and usually require showing that the measure is designed to
achieve a legitimate policy objective in the least trade restrictive way.215
WTO trade rules do not consider protection of domestic producers from
foreign competition a legitimate policy objective.216
A border tax adjustment (BTA) has the best chance of preserving
competitiveness while avoiding WTO challenge. The BTA could be
explained as “simply the import-equivalent of domestic U.S. climate
policy.”217 The BTA should be carefully crafted to avoid discrimination
against imports, both as against U.S. products and between products
imported from different countries.218 Of course, this is more easily said
than done. The GHG emissions from the production of similar or identical
products may vary depending on the individual producer as well as the
country of production.219 A WTO-compliant BTA may be fairly simple
to craft if the U.S. adopts a carbon tax, but faces additional complexity if
the U.S. adopts a cap-and-trade system. In a cap-and-trade system with
fluctuating market prices, it is difficult to determine whether the BTA
accurately reflects the burden that the imported product would have
imposed had it been made domestically.220 The issue becomes even

214. Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The
Limits and Options of International Trade Law (April 2007) available at www.nicholas.
duke.edu/institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf. “As the United States is internationally bound by
WTO law, any competitiveness provision that violates WTO agreements risks a challenge by
the US’ trading partners before the WTO dispute settlement body.” Id.
215. Houser et al., supra note 212, at 31.
216. Id.
217. Pauwelyn, supra note 216, at 16.
218. Tamiotti et al, supra note 61, at 101.
219. Id.
220. Tamiotti et al, supra note 61, at 101 (“The main challenges [to implementing a
border tax adjustment are] (i) the difficulty in assessing product specific emissions, and
(ii) the fluctuations of the carbon price (or allowance price) in the context of an emission
trading scheme.”).
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more complex if the allowances are not auctioned but rather distributed
for free.221
XI. CONCLUSION
Coordinating a cap-and-trade scheme with the existing Federal income
tax system, while perhaps not as challenging as nuclear physics or string
theory, is a task of daunting complexity. Assuming, as I have been, that
the U.S. enacts cap-and-trade legislation in essentially similar form to
the pending legislative proposals, the first step is to determine the tax
consequences of receiving the allowances. If all the allowances were
auctioned, the answer would be simple: the receipt would not be taxable
and the allowance would have a tax basis that equals the purchase price.
For a free allowance, the value of the allowance could either be taxable
on receipt (in whole or in part), taxable when used, or not taxable at all.
Commentators have persuasively argued that the allowances should be
taxable when received. Taxing the allowances when received would
provide rough parity between those businesses who use the allowances
and those who sell them.
Next, what tax consequences flow from the use or sale of the allowances?
The use of the allowances will likely produce a current deduction for
tax purposes. The gain or loss recognized on the allowances could either
be characterized as capital or ordinary. Current tax rules would likely
characterize allowances as ordinary assets in the hands of covered firms
but as capital assets in the hands of investors. Covered firms could benefit
from significant deferral of tax consequences by banking and borrowing
allowances. Treating the allowances as ordinary assets in the hands of
all holders would simplify the tax treatment and may reduce speculation,
but would create inconsistent tax treatment vis-a-vis other investment
assets. This inconsistency could reduce the liquidity and transparency of
the carbon market.
The taxation of carbon derivatives is a perplexing problem, although
perhaps not more so than the taxation of any derivative financial product.
Particularly in the early years of carbon trading, uncertainty about the
tax consequences may cause burdens on investors and the IRS alike. On
221. Pauwelyn, supra note 216, at 21–22. See also Houser et al., supra note 212, at
34 (noting that “given the number of variables in terms of production methods, capital
stock, and energy sources, it is nearly impossible to accurately assess embedded emissions of
goods at the border on a case-by-case basis”).
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the other hand, the IRS has developed rules for taxing SOx and NOx
allowance trades, which could provide guidance.
Implementing a cap-and-trade system has significant international
trade implications that could best be addressed by a border tax adjustment
(BTA). A WTO-compliant BTA is easier to craft if the domestic carbon
mitigation scheme is a carbon tax rather than cap-and-trade. A cap-andtrade scheme results in fluctuating carbon prices, making it difficult to
impose a BTA that is similar to the cost impact of the domestic cap-andtrade. Free distribution of allowances further complicates the calculation.
Finally, imposing a cost on carbon, whether via a cap-and-trade scheme
or a carbon tax will change the effectiveness of tax incentives for lowcarbon energy. Each tax incentive should be carefully examined to assess
whether it is still needed. Renewable energy tax incentives might still be
justified because of barriers to capital investment and slow consumer
response.
Similarly, either a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax would impose
disproportionate costs on lower income households. In fairness, the burden
of saving the planet should not fall on the poor. The tax system can smooth
the impact. Auctioning carbon allowances would provide the necessary
revenue. In sum, a cap-and-trade system represents a more complicated
alternative to restricting carbon emissions. Policymakers should not forget
the tax system when implementing cap-and-trade. Thoughtful attention
to tax consequences of cap-and-trade design could produce a smoother
transition to a cooler world.
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